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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Foreign Divorce-Fraudulent Domicile-Full Faith and Credit
In Donnell v. Howell' the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the full faith and credit clause' did not apply to a foreign divorce
decree obtained through fraudulent allegations of domicile in an
Alabama court. A brief review of prior decisions seems appropriate
in order to put this case in context.
The first of the celebrated Williams v. North Carolina decisions
involved a criminal prosecution for bigamous cohabitation. The
United States Supreme Court held that for a state to have jurisdic-
tion to grant a divorce, at least one of the parties must be domiciled
in the state which awards the decree. The second Williams decision
4
held that full faith and credit need not be accorded to a foreign
divorce decree obtained in an ex parte proceeding where neither party
was domiciled in the awarding state. This blow to the efficacy of
the full faith and credit doctrine was somewhat softened by the
subsequent decisions of Sherrer v. Sherrer' and Coe v. Coe." In
these two decisions, the Court held that decrees obtained by fraudulent
due for services rendered in a prior action, and B alleged negligence on the
part of A in the management and conduct of that action. In the prior litiga-
tion the court ruled that A had not been negligent in discovering after the
trial that a certain decree upon which the opposing party based his claim
had been rendered in vacation time, and was, therefore, void, and ruled that
B was entitled to a bill of review. This finding was held conclusive in the
A-B suit, with no discussion of party or privy requirements.
In the principal case the clients alleged that they had been damaged in the
sum of $4203.54. Subsequent to the reported opinion the case was settled for
$2200.00. Letter From Rodman & Rodman, Attorneys For Plaintiffs, to Sam
S. Woodley Jr., December 6, 1962. While it would have been difficult for
plaintiffs to prove there was a meritorious defense, the court having ruled
as a matter of law, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs,
that there was none; still defendant was undoubtedly reluctant to have the
case go to trial.
1 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
'U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
8317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). For excellent dis-
cussions of the total effect of Williais and subsequent litigation, see Baer, So
Your Client Wants a Divorce!, 24 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1945) ; Baer, The After-
"math of Williams v. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REv. 265 (1950); Baer, The
Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L.
REv. 265 (1958).
334 U.S. 343 (1948). In Sherrer the defendant's attorney denied the
allegations of the plaintiff's domicile in the Florida divorce proceedings.
However, there Was no subsequent attempt to disprove the domicile.
0334 U.S. 378 (1948). Coe was a companion case to Sherrer and in-
volved a Nevada proceeding wherein the allegations of domicile were ad-
mitted by the defendant.
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jurisdiction in a sister state could not be collaterally attacked and
were entitled to full faith and credit where: (1) there was participa-
tion in the divorce action by the defendant, (2) full opportunity to
contest the jurisdictional issue of domicile was afforded the defend-
ant, and (3) where the decree would not be subject to collateral
attack in the awarding state. When these requirements have been
met, res judicata applies to the jurisdictional issue of domicile. Re-
gardless of whether the issue of domicile was actually litigated, the
decree is entitled to full faith and credit.'
In the principal case, the plaintiff-wife brought a partition pro-
ceeding8 concerning certain real property. She alleged that the
property was held with the defendant-husband as tenants in common
as a result of an Alabama divorce. The defendant answered that
the divorce was null and void because plaintiff was a bona fide resi-
dent of North Carolina at the time of the divorce. Therefore they still
held the property as tenants by the entirety, and no partition pro-
ceedings could be enforced.9 The defendant had entered a general
and personal appearance in the Alabama proceedings by signing a
notice of waiver and answer to the complaint. By this instrument,
the defendant waived all service of process, submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of that court, and admitted that the plaintiff was a bona
fide resident of Alabama. The plaintiff replied that the effect of the
defendant's having signed the instrument was: (1) to estop the
defendant from attacking the decree, and (2) to entitle the decree
to full faith and credit. 10
It was clear from the facts that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant had ever been domiciled in Alabama. The court found
that there was no estoppel." The court then held that the decree
7 334 U.S. at 351-52.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-3 (1950) allows such special proceedings for joint
tenants or tenants in common. When the parties are divorced, they become
tenants in common rather than remaining tenants by the entirety. Mc-
Kinnon, Currie & Co. v. Caulk, 167 N.C. 411, 83 S.E. 559 (1914).
° The rule in North Carolina appears to be that a tenant by the entirety
cannot force partition without the consent of the spouse. See, e.g., Davis v.
Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 208, 124 S.E. 566, 570 (1924) (dictum) ; Jones v. W. A.
Smith & Co., 149 N.C. 318, 319, 62 S.E. 1092, 1093 (1908) (dictum).
10 257 N.C. at 177, 125 S.E.2d at 450.
1 There could be no true estoppel. The plaintiff knew all of the material
facts and had not been misled. She was actively trying to enjoy the benefits
of her fraudulent act. The defendant was merely trying to resist. Al-
though the defendant had participated with her in the fraud, to estop him
19631
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was subject to collateral attack and that full faith and credit did not
apply. The Sherrer and Coe cases were. distinguished on the grounds
that in the Donnell case: (1) the defendant was not at the trial, (2)
the defendant did not participate in the trial, and (3) the defendant
vvas not represented by counsel at the trial. 2 The first two reasons
given for refusing to invoke the Sherrer doctrine seem clearly in-
sufficient. In a United States Supreme Court decision,'" the de-
fendant's sole participation in the divorce action was by attorney,
and the Court held the decree was not subject to collateral at-
tack. The Sherrer and Coe cases were cited as controlling. The
third reason given would seem equally insufficient because the only
requirement laid down by the Sherrer case is that there be participa-
tion by the defendant. There appears to be no requirement of a cer-
tain degree of participation. There was participation in Donnell.
by his answer and waiver, the defendant entered a general and
personal appearance and became a party to the suit.' 4 The defendant
clearly participated, but failed to take advantage of his opportunity
to contest the issue of domicile.' 5
Perhaps a better attempt at evading the effect of the Sherrer
doctrine could have been made. It could have been argued that
the failure of the defendant to be at the trial, or to have a lawyer, may.
have resulted in there not having been a full opportunity to contest
the issue of domicile.' 6 Still another device would be that the decree
would be subject to collateral attack in the awarding state, Alabama,
"would be [productive of] an offense against public morals and good con-
science, a reflection upon the integrity of the court, and productive of per-
jury." Id. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 455. For comprehensive treatments of the
doctrine of estoppel with respect to the validity of foreign divorce decrees,
see, e.g., Annots., 175 A.L.R. 538 (1948), 153 A.L.R. 941 (1944), 140 A.L.R.
914 (1942), 122 A.L.R. 1321 (1939), 109 A.L.R. 1018 (1937).
- 2 Id. at 187, 125 S.E.2d at 457.
" ohnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
14 In order to overcome the validity of a foreign decree, it would seem
that the attacking party has the burden of showing that the defendant never
made an appearance in the divorce action. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128
(1951) (dictum).
" "If respondent failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
him, the responsibility is his own. We do not believe that the dereliction of
a defendant [to litigate the issue of domicile] under such circumstances
should be permitted to provide a basis for subsequent attack in the court of
a sister State on a decree valid in the State in which it was rendered."
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948).
" See Note, Participation by Defendant Spouse in a Foreign Divorce




and hence not subject to full faith and credit under the Sherrer-Coe
decisions.
17
. It should not be overlooked that the exact fact situation in Don-
nell has not been before the United States Supreme Court, i.e. where
the sole participation by the defendant was the signing of a written
instrument."8 In this fact situation, the states have reached different
results. Some states grant full faith and credit, 9 while others, like
North Carolina have refused to extend full faith and credit to this fact
situation.2" And still other courts may or may not give full faith
and credit, depending on the circumstances of the case.2 '
' In Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961), the parties
appeared in an action to modify a decree which had been effective for six
years. When the trial judge found that both parties admitted that neither
had ever been domiciled, and that they had consequently worked a fraud
on the awarding court, he vacated the decree. The Supreme Court of Ala-
bama affirmed. The requirement of the full faith and credit doctrine is that
a sister state give the decree as much effect as it would be given in the
awarding state. When Alabama vacates its decrees, why not let North Caro-
lina do the same to an Alabama decree on an identical fact situation?
In Hudson v. Hudson, 69 N.J. Super. 128, 173 A.2d 721' (Super. Ct. Ch.
1961), the court refused to examine a decree on the basis'of Hartigan. For
discussions concluding that this approach would be impermissible, see
Comment, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 459, 468-69 (1962); Ross & Crawford,
Greshem's Law of Domestic Relations: The Alabama Quickie, 27 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 224, 246 (1961). See also, Note, 36 TUL. L. REV., 154 (1961).
But cf. Rosenbluth v. Rosenbluth, 34 Misc. 2d 290, 228 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. 1962) which held that a third party could attack an Alabama divorce
decree on this basis and was not precluded by full faith and credit.
For evidence that Alabama is concerned with the fraudulent domicile
problem, see Ross & Crawford, supra at 241-42.
" In both Sherrer and Coe the parties were both present at the proceed-'
ings and represented by counsel. In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951), the defendant was represented by counsel. In Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S.
126 (1951), there was no determination of the extent of the defendant's
participation.
1 in re Raynor's Estate, 220 Cal. App. 2d 715, 332 P.2d 416 (3d Dist.
1958) (defendant's sole participation was by signing a notice and waiver);
In re Day's Estate, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 131 N.E.2d 50 (1956); Boxer v. Boxer,
12 Misc. 2d 205, 177 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Supp. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1001,
184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1959), aff'd 'mem., 7 N.Y.2d 781, 163 N.E.2d 149 (1959)
(defendant signed a power of attorney); Chittick v. Chittick, 332 Mass. 554,
126 N.E.2d 495 (1955) (sole participation was having lawyer at the pro-
ceedings).
" Gherardi De Parata v. Gherardi De Parata, 179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1962); Eaton v. Eaton, 227 La. 992, 81 So. 2d 371 (1955); Pelle
v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 182 A.2d 37 (1962); Brasier v. Brasier, 200 Okla.
689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948). Cf. Davis v. Davis, 259 Wis. 1, 47 N.W.2d
338 (1951) where the court required physical participation by the defendant
and refused to grant full faith to the decree, even though the defendant was
represented by counsel at the trial.
2 In New Jersey full faith was denied where the plaintiff obtained a
power of attorney from the defendant and obtained a foreign divorce.
1963]
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In Sherrer and Coe there were indications that the decisions
would add certainty to the marital status.2 As the above cases
bear witness, certainty has not resulted. The courts are seizing on
insignificant factual variations to avoid Sherrer and to prevent their
own divorce laws from becoming ineffective.
The Sherrer case and other related decisions by the United States
Supreme Court may be beneficial in that their effect is to allow
quicker divorces which are needed in our modern society.23 Perhaps
the Constitution demands that the full faith and credit doctrine be
upheld. 4  However it seems that the merits lie elsewhere. It is
questionable that the full faith and credit clause should be used to
defeat a state's divorce laws. The marriage relation is a basic insti-
tution of our society, and a state should be able to prescribe its own
laws reflecting this relationship. Other states, for monetary or other
considerations, should not be able to defeat the laws of sister states in
proceedings tainted with fraud. Although the court's reasoning in
Donnell may be faulty, the result nevertheless seems desirable because
such a fraudulent proceeding was nullified. But the practical effect
of Donnell is only that the parties now have to either hire a lawyer,
or be at the trial personally, to be protected by full faith and credit.
What is needed to remedy this situation is clear. The United
States Supreme Court should re-examine and overrule the Sherrer
and Coe cases and return to the Williams decision in order to prevent
this fraudulent circumvention of the individual state's divorce law.
The integrity of our divorce laws should not be defeated by a twisted
and hollow use of the full faith and credit doctrine.
JOHN SIKES JOHNSTON
Staedler v. Staedler, 6 NJ. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951). But where the de-
fendant got his own attorney, full faith was granted. Hudson v. Hudson,
69 NJ. Super. 128, 173 A.2d 721 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1961), Schlemm v.
Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d 508 (1960).
In the District of Columbia, full faith was denied where the defendant,
in a distraught condition, signed a power of attorney. Ryan v. Ryan, 139
F. Supp. 98 (D.D.C. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1956). But full
faith was granted when the defendant signed a notice of waiver and entry
of appearance. Drinkwater v. Drinkwater, 111 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1953).
22 For a discussion of the merits of this "certainty," see 334 U.S. at 363,
368-69 (dissenting opinion).
2 See generally Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-
Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1-4 (1955).
2 334 U.S. at 355.
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